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The study of approximate mechanism design for fa-
cility location problems has been in the center of
research at the intersection of artificial intelligence
and economics for the last decades, largely due to
its practical importance in various domains, such
as social planning and clustering. At a high level,
the goal is to design mechanisms to select a set
of locations on which to build a set of facilities,
aiming to optimize some social objective and en-
sure desirable properties based on the preferences
of strategic agents, who might have incentives to
misreport their private information such as their lo-
cations. This paper presents a comprehensive sur-
vey of the significant progress that has been made
since the introduction of the problem, highlighting
the different variants and methodologies, as well as
the most interesting directions for future research.
1 Introduction
The study of facility location problems arises from combina-
torial optimization, and aims at computing the optimal place-
ment of facilities to minimize transportation costs for servic-
ing customers [Hochbaum, 1982]. Besides locating actual
facilities, the problem has also found a wide range of appli-
cations in other fields such as healthcare [Ahmadi-Javid et
al., 2017], clustering [Friedman et al., 2001], and even prob-
lems that are not of a geographical nature, ranging from as
simple as choosing the temperature for a classroom, to more
advanced ones, like selecting a committee to represent peo-
ple with different political views. Because of its practical
importance, variants of facility location problems have at-
tracted significant attention for a long time from different
fields, such as operations research, theoretical computer sci-
ence, economics and computational game theory.
In the last two research areas mentioned above, facility lo-
cation problems are studied under a different light: strategic
customers (referred to as agents) may have incentives to mis-
report their private information, such as their preferred loca-
tions, in order to manipulate the final outcome in their fa-
vor. A strategyproof mechanism is a predefined rule which
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maps the preferences of the agents into appropriately chosen
locations of the facilities, in a way that does not incentivize
the agents to engage in such strategic considerations. Strate-
gyproof mechanisms are certainly desirable, but they come at
a cost; to ensure the truthful behavior of the participants, they
often need to return sub-optimal solutions. One of the main
investigations of the field of computational social choice the-
ory [Brandt et al., 2016] is precisely to quantify this loss in
efficiency due to the requirement for strategyproofness.
In fact, more than a decade ago, Procaccia and Tennenholtz
[2009] used one of the most basic variants of facility location
problems to put forward the agenda of approximate mech-
anism design without money, which advocates the study of
strategyproof mechanisms for various optimization problems
through the lens of the approximation ratio, a celebrated no-
tion in the field of theoretical computer science and approxi-
mation algorithms. The major difference between this agenda
and prior work in algorithms is that here, the need for ap-
proximation does not come from computational limitations,
but primarily due to the need for strategyproofness. The set-
ting studied by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009] is that of
a single facility to be built on a real line, and in which the
agents’ preferences are given by their ideal locations (their
“peaks”), together with linear cost functions that are increas-
ing at a fixed rate as one moves away from the peak.
A key characteristic of this setting, which makes it particu-
larly amenable to the design of strategyproof mechanisms, is
that the preferences of the agents are single-peaked.1 This
type of preferences, originally studied by Black [1948], is
known to escape classic impossibility results and allows for
winners of pairwise majority votes (referred to in the liter-
ature as “Condorcet winners”). Single-peaked preferences
were popularized by the result of Moulin [1980], who identi-
fied all the possible strategyproof mechanisms for this setting
by means of a characterization. Among those mechanisms,
we highlight the Median-point mechanism below, phrased in
appropriate terminology for facility location problems.
Mechanism (Median-point mechanism). Place the single fa-
cility at the median of the peaks of the agents.
It is not hard to see that this mechanism is strategyproof; an
agent can only affect the position of the median by reporting
1In fact, these are specific types of single-peaked preferences
called 1-Euclidean, see [Hotelling, 1990].
her peak to be on the “opposite” side of the median, but in
that case the median can only “move away” from her peak.
As a matter of fact, the Median-point mechanism is simply
a majority outcome, something that was already observed by
Black [1948] in his original paper.
Since the introduction of the agenda by Procaccia and Ten-
nenholtz [2009], research in this area has flourished. For fa-
cility location problems in particular, a very fruitful line of
work in the major venues in artificial intelligence and eco-
nomics and computation has been concerned with several
variants and generalizations of the main setting, often mi-
grating from the “convenience” of single-peakedness and thus
giving rise to much more challenging problems. The ultimate
goal of this survey is to provide a comprehensive overview of
the achievements of this literature on designing strategyproof
mechanisms for these different variants. The only other sur-
vey on strategyproof facility location problems that we are
aware of is that of [Cheng and Zhou, 2015], which is however
mainly focused on the more classic settings. While we do
highlight some of the earlier results on the problem as well,
we put extra emphasis on the results of the last half decade,
which has witnessed remarkable achievements.
1.1 The Classic Setting
We formally introduce the classic facility location setting in
this section, which was studied in most of the earlier works
on the problem; various extensions are presented in later sec-
tions. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents who are located
in a metric space (M,d), where M is a set of all possible
positions and d : M ×M → R is a distance function that sat-
isfies the triangle inequality. We use x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈Mn
to denote the location profile of the n agents. In a k-facility
location setting, where the goal is to place k facilities, a (de-
terministic) mechanism is a function f : Mn → Mk that
maps the agents’ locations x to k locations of the facilities.
A randomized mechanism outputs a probability distribution
over all subsets of M with size k. Given a location profile
f(x) of k facilities, each agent i ∈ N has a cost c(f(x), xi).
Usually, the cost is defined as the distance to the nearest fa-
cility, i.e., c(f(x), xi) = miny∈f(x) d(xi, y). When f(x) is a
distribution, the cost is defined as the expected distance. We
remark that when there is only one facility (k = 1) and the
metric space is the real line, we recover the original setting of
[Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009].
In the strategic setting, the location xi of each agent i ∈ N
is private information. For any S ⊆ N and i ∈ N , we use
xS to denote x projected to S and x−i to N\{i}. Therefore,
mechanism f is strategyproof if for all x ∈Mn,
c(f(x), xi) ≤ c(f(xi,x−i), xi) for all i ∈ N, x′i ∈M.
In simple words, a strategyproof mechanism requires that no
agent can benefit from misreporting, regardless of the re-
ported positions of the others agents. A stronger notion is
group strategyproofness, which requires that for any location
profile x and any coalition S ⊆ N , there is no joint deviation
x′S of the agents in S such that all the agents in S benefit.
As we mentioned earlier, the goal of approximate mecha-
nism design without money is to optimize some objective un-
der the requirement that the employed mechanisms are strat-
egyproof. The two most widely studied objectives in the lit-
erature of the problem are the social cost and the maximum
cost. Formally, given agent profile x and facility locations y,









In economic terms, the social cost is analogous to the utilitar-
ian social welfare, whereas the maximum cost is analogous
to the egalitarian social welfare.
The objective of a strategyproof mechanism f is to com-
pute locations y such that SC(y,x) or MC(y,x) is mini-
mized. A mechanism f has an approximation ratio α ≥ 1 for
the social cost objective, if for any location profile x ∈Mn,
SC(f(x),x) ≤ α · min
y∈Mk
SC(y,x).
The approximation ratio is defined similarly for the maximum
cost objective, or any of the other objectives that we will dis-
cuss in later sections.
Challenges. Strategyproofness is a rather stringent and
fragile property, which makes the design of good strate-
gyproof mechanisms particularly challenging, since robust-
ness to strategic behavior has to be guaranteed for every pos-
sible instance of the problem. To demonstrate this, consider
the single-facility on the real line setting studied by Procac-
cia and Tennenholtz [2009]. It is not hard to observe that the
Median-point mechanism is in fact optimal for the social cost
objective; for any other choice, the cost of more than half
of the agents is increased by the same amount that the cost
of the remaining (less than half) of the agents is decreased
by. For the maximum cost objective however, the optimal
choice, which is to place the facility at the midpoint of the
two extreme reported locations, is no longer strategyproof;
this is due to the fact e.g., the agent at the leftmost posi-
tion would be incentivized to report a position further to the
left, forcing the midpoint to be closer to her real location.
The Median-point mechanism in this case only achieves a
2-approximation and in fact, this is the best possible among
any strategyproof mechanism for the problem [Procaccia and
Tennenholtz, 2009]. In more general metric spaces and for
more facilities, the situation becomes ever more challenging.
One way to circumvent such barriers is to use randomiza-
tion, and consider a slightly weaker notion of strategyproof-
ness, often referred to as truthfulness in expectation; this no-
tion stipulates that an agent will not decrease her expected
cost by misreporting, even if her cost might in fact decrease
in some realizations of randomness. An example of such a
mechanism proposed by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009]
for their setting is the following one.
Mechanism (Left-right-middle (LRM) mechanism). Select
the peak of the leftmost agent with probability 1/4, the peak
of the rightmost agent with probability 1/4 and the midpoint
of the interval defined by those peaks with probability 1/2.
It was shown in [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009] that
this mechanism achieves an approximation ratio of 3/2 for
the maximum cost objective, a notable improvement of the
2-approximation barrier for deterministic mechanisms. In
more general settings, the benefits of randomization are far
more pronounced, improving the best possible approxima-
tions from linear functions in the number of agents to small
constants [Lu et al., 2010].
The ultimate goal of mechanism design for facility loca-
tion is to be applied to practical scenarios of social planning,
by providing strategyproof mechanisms with guarantees on
social efficiency. While the classic setting described above
is a crucial starting point in these investigations, the plethora
of different variants that have appeared over the years take
further steps towards applicability in real-world scenarios.
Roadmap. We first introduce the results on the classic setting
of strategyproof facility location in Section 2, and we pro-
ceed to discuss more recent variants in the next sections. Sec-
tion 3 is devoted to settings with more advanced agents’ pref-
erences, whereas Section 4 is concerned with mechanisms
that either have enhanced capabilities, or need to be robust
against stronger types of manipulations. In Section 5 we dis-
cuss settings with more complicated constraints on the facil-
ities, and in Section 6, we discuss several further variants of
the problem along different axes. In Section 7, we identify
interesting avenues for future work on the problem.
2 The Classic Facility Location Setting:
Methods and Results
We begin our exposition with the earlier works on the prob-
lem, which we refer to as the “classic” setting.
2.1 Locating a Single Facility
The foundations of locating a single facility on the real line
are based on the work of [Moulin, 1980]. As we explained
earlier, the Median-point mechanism is strategyproof (in fact,
group strategyproof) and optimal for the social cost objec-
tive, and is 2-approximate for the maximum cost, which is
the best possible among strategyproof mechanisms [Procac-
cia and Tennenholtz, 2009]. In terms of randomized mech-
anisms, the LRM mechanism is 3/2-approximate, which is
also best possible among randomized strategyproof mecha-
nisms, as proven in the same work. In that sense, the approx-
imate mechanism design problem for a single facility on the
line was settled in [Procaccia and Tennenholtz, 2009].
The single-facility problem for more general metrics was
studied by Alon et al. [2010], who designed strategyproof
mechanisms for circles and general graphs. A highlight of
their results is that randomization can be used to escape a
rather strong impossibility result, namely that in circle net-
works, the approximation ratio of any deterministic mecha-
nism for the social cost is Ω(n). In particular, they employed
the following well-known randomized strategyproof mecha-
nism and showed that it achieves an approximation ratio of
2− 2/n on general graphs.
Mechanism. (Random Dictatorship (RD)) Select an agent
uniformly at random, and place the facility at her peak.
Meir [2019] showed that for three agents on a circle, improve-
ments over the RD mechanism are possible. Feldman and
Wilf [2013] proposed a family of generalized mechanisms
on trees (the “parameterized boomerang mechanisms”) which
generalize both the RD and the Median-point mechanism.
Dokow et al. [2012] presented similar characterizations to
that of [Schummer and Vohra, 2002] for discrete lines and
circles. Recently, Tang et al. [2020a] provided a character-
ization of deterministic and randomized group strategyproof
unanimous mechanisms in convex spaces (generalizing and
extending some classic results of [Bordes et al., 1990]), and
showed approximation ratio bounds that can be obtained as
a consequence of their characterization. Filimonov and Meir
[2021] gave a full characterization of onto and strategyproof
mechanisms in discrete trees.
2.2 Locating Two Facilities
For two facilities, most of the related work is focused on the
line metric. This setting was in fact also studied by Procaccia
and Tennenholtz [2009] in their original paper. In particular,
they showed that the very simple mechanism that places one
facility on the leftmost peak and the other on the rightmost
peak is group strategyproof and achieves an (n− 2)- approx-
imation for the social cost. They also provided a lower bound
of 3/2 for any strategyproof mechanism; this was later im-
proved to almost 2 [Lu et al., 2009] and to an asymptotically
tight bound of Ω(n) [Lu et al., 2010]. Fotakis and Tzamos
[2014] proved a tight lower bound of n − 2, thus settling
the social cost objective for this setting. These works also
considered randomized strategyproof mechanisms, with the
best known approximation ratio being 4, given by the Pro-
portional Mechanism of [Lu et al., 2010]. The same approx-
imation ratio in fact applies to general metrics as well.
For the maximum cost objective, Procaccia and Tennen-
holtz [2009] showed that their “two extremes” mechanism
achieves a best possible 2-approximation, and showed how
randomization can be used to achieve improved bounds.
2.3 Beyond Two Facilities
Escoffier et al. [2011] designed strategyproof mechanisms to
locate n− 1 facilities in both general metric spaces and trees,
providing linear upper bounds and constant lower bounds.
For the real line metric, Fotakis and Tzamos [2016] presented
a randomized strategyproof mechanism for any number of fa-
cilities k, the Equal Cost mechanism, which achieves approx-
imation ratios of n and 2 for the social cost and the maximum
cost respectively. Interestingly, the mechanism achieves these
bounds even in the more general case where the cost func-
tions are concave. For the social cost objective, Fotakis and
Tzamos [2014] showed that anonymous deterministic strate-
gyproof mechanisms for k ≤ 3 cannot achieve any bounded
ratio, even if the metric is the real line and there are 3 facilities
and 4 agents; this includes the Percentile mechanisms studied
in [Sui et al., 2013]. Walsh [2020b] studied the k-facility
location problem in 2-dimensional Euclidean and Manhat-
tan spaces and provided impossibility results in terms of ax-
iomatic properties.
3 More Involved Preferences
A common characteristic of the earlier works in facility loca-
tion is that they study settings in which agents have a most-
preferred point, and the cost functions are given as distances
from that point. The second half of the past decade however
witnessed the emergence of a plethora of results on different
models, in which the preferences of the agents are more in-
volved, giving rise to new challenges in terms of the design of
good strategyproof mechanisms. In this section, we highlight
the most prominent of those variants.
3.1 Obnoxious Facility Location
The location of an obnoxious (in the sense of “unwanted”)
facility is in fact a rather classic problem in the literature on
algorithms and optimization (e.g., see [Church and Garfinkel,
1978]). In this setting each agent would rather have the facil-
ity (e.g., a waste facility) built as far away as possible from
her specified location (e.g., the location of her house); and the
distance from that location to the facility is interpreted as her
utility. In the context of approximate mechanism design, this
setting was studied most notably by Cheng et al. [2013], who
proposed strategyproof mechanisms for networks, which are
based on a majority vote between two prespecified locations.
For the line metric and different objectives, the problem was
studied by Ye et al. [2015]. Ibara and Nagamochi [2012] pro-
vided characterization results for (group) strategyproof mech-
anisms for some special cases of the problem.
3.2 Heterogeneous Facility Location
Building upon the ideas of the obnoxious facility literature,
a follow-up line of work, (e.g., [Feigenbaum and Sethura-
man, 2015; Zou and Li, 2015; Serafino and Ventre, 2014;
Serafino and Ventre, 2015]) considered models in which fa-
cilities can be both desirable and undesirable, from the per-
spective of different agents. In terms of strategyproofness,
here it makes sense to distinguish between the cases where
the preferences (desirable vs undesirable), or the locations of
the agents are private information, or both. While these set-
tings appear under many different names in the literature, we
will use the term heterogeneous facility location to classify
them under the same umbrella; we highlight the major vari-
ants within this part of the literature.
Dual preferences. One of the first heterogeneous facility lo-
cation models studied in this literature was the dual prefer-
ence model, proposed independently by [Zou and Li, 2015]
and [Feigenbaum and Sethuraman, 2015]. In this setting each
agent finds some facility either desirable or undesirable, but
different agents have potentially different opinions. For the
case of known locations, Zou and Li [2015] proved that it
is possible to design an optimal strategyproof mechanism for
the social welfare (the equivalent of the social cost for set-
tings with utilities), whereas when both preferences and lo-
cations are unknown, they proposed a 3-approximate deter-
ministic group strategyproof mechanism. In fact, the results
of [Ibara and Nagamochi, 2012] for the obnoxious facility lo-
cation (which is a special case of the dual preference setting)
imply that this is actually best possible among strategyproof
mechanisms; this was also proven independently by Feigen-
baum and Sethuraman [2015], who further provided lower
bounds for randomized mechanisms. Kyropoulouetal [2019]
studied a related setting in which the facility can be located
on a constrained feasible region of the Euclidean plane.
Optional preferences. A somewhat different model was con-
sidered first by Serafino and Ventre [2014; 2015], that of op-
tional preferences. In that setting, there are two facilities to be
built, each agent is “interested” in either facility or both, and
her cost is equal to the sum of distances from her position to
the locations of the facilities she is interested in (the sum func-
tion). The setting was later extended by Yuan et al. [2016]
who considered the min and max functions instead, and they
proved upper and lower bounds on the approximation ratio
of deterministic strategyproof mechanisms for different ob-
jective functions. The upper bound for the min function was
later improved [Li et al., 2019a]. Recently, Deligkas et al.
[2021] studied a utility version: A mechanism takes as input
the positions and the preferences of the agents, and chooses
to locate a single facility. Each agent has a utility equal to one
minus her distance to the facility located if she is interested in
it, and zero otherwise. Under three different settings depend-
ing on the level of agent-related information that is public or
private, they designed strategyproof mechanisms that achieve
a good approximation for maximizing the total utility.
Heterogeneous preferences for k facilities. Anastasiadis
and Deligkas [2018] considered a setting with k facilities
such that, for each facility, an agent prefers to be either close
to the facility, far from it, or is indifferent between the two
choices. In a sense, their setting merges the dual preference
and the optional preference models described above, and ex-
tends them to more facilities. They studied mainly the egali-
tarian welfare (the utility equivalent of the maximum cost ob-
jective), but also obtained some results on the social welfare
as a byproduct.
Fractional preferences. Another generalization of the op-
tional preference model was proposed in [Fong et al., 2018],
that of the fractional preference model. In this setting, the
preference of each agent for the facility is a number between 0
and 1 (rather than either 0 or 1, as in the case of optional pref-
erences), with these numbers summing up to 1. Among other
results, the authors show that when the locations are known,
it is possible to achieve the maximum social welfare by a
strategyproof mechanism, when the preferences are known,
a 2 approximation is possible and when the locations and the
preferences are private, there is a deterministic 4-approximate
mechanism for the problem.
4 More Involved Incentives
In all the aforementioned works, the ability of the agents to
misreport is limited to either their locations or their prefer-
ences. In this section we discuss some representative vari-
ants where the space of possible manipulations is extended,
as well as variants in which mechanisms are given additional
power to deal with the agents’ incentives.
Multiple locations. Besides the basic setting, Procaccia and
Tennenholtz [2009] in their seminal paper also considered a
natural extension where each agent controls multiple loca-
tions, and her cost is either the total distance or the maxi-
mum distance from her locations to the facility. Hossain et
al. [2020] further assumed that each agent may control mul-
tiple locations with different degrees of importance, and de-
signed mechanisms which elicit the locations of the agents, as
well as different levels of information about their importance.
In their setting, in addition to misreporting their locations,
agents may also hide some of their locations, if that serves
their purposes. Yan and Chen [2020] enhanced the space of
possible manipulations even further, assuming that the agents
can replicate some of their locations as well, and fully char-
acterized all mechanisms that are anonymous, efficient, and
robust to manipulation with respect to this richer space of
strategic behavior. Babaioff et al. [2016] studied three-stage
mechanisms by introducing strategic mediators, where each
agent is associated with exactly one mediator, and the cost of
a mediator is the total cost of the agents that she represents. In
this setting, the agents first strategically report their locations
to the mediators, and then the mediators strategically report
them to the mechanism.
False-name manipulations. Another type of manipulation
which has been studied in the literature of mechanism de-
sign for anonymous environments is that of false-name ma-
nipulation (also known as sybil-proofness, e.g., see [Babaioff
et al., 2012]), where an agent can report more than once
by creating and using fake identifiers (e.g., different email
addresses or repeatedly logging onto an online service). A
mechanism that is robust against standard and false-name
manipulations is called false-name-proof (FNP), and is thus
stronger than a simply strategyproof mechanism. False-
name manipulations in facility location were first consid-
ered by Todo et al. [2011], who provided a characteriza-
tion of FNP mechanisms for single-facility location on the
real line, and proved that the mechanism that places the fa-
cility at the location of the leftmost agent achieves the best
possible approximation for both the social cost and the max-
imum cost. Sonoda et al. [2016] studied FNP mechanisms
for locating two facilities and proved that the “two extreme”
mechanism is the best possible deterministic FNP mecha-
nism on a line, while randomized mechanisms can achieve
improved approximations. Nehama et al. [2019] defined a
family of graphs that is called ZV-line graphs, and proved
that there is a general facility location mechanism for these
graphs that is strategyproof, false-name-proof and Pareto op-
timal. Other works that studied this type of manipulation
in the context of facility location are [Ono et al., 2017;
Todo et al., 2020].
Mechanism design with verification. Motivated by settings
in which strategyproofness is not enough to guarantee small
approximation ratios, Fotakis and Tzamos [2010] and Nis-
sim et al. [2012] first considered winner-imposing mech-
anisms, which are capable of penalizing possibly deceitful
agents by restricting how these agents interact with the out-
come, e.g., by requiring agents to “use” the facility that is
closer to their reported location. Fotakis and Tzamos [2010]
proved that a winner-imposing extension of the Proportional
Mechanism of [Lu et al., 2010] is strategyproof and achieves
a 4k-approximation for the k-Facility Location game on the
real line. In general, this line of research fits under the um-
brella of mechanism design with verification (e.g., see [Cara-
giannis et al., 2012]).
5 Constrained Facilities
Besides the different preference structures that were studied
in previous models, the motivation from real-world applica-
tions drove researchers to consider additional constraints on
the facilities rather than the agents, which might have to do
with their capacities (e.g., in terms of physical storage or ser-
vice time) or their possible locations. We highlight the major
associated results below.
Limited locations. In the standard setting, the location of the
facility is assumed to be some point in a continuum of pos-
sible points. In reality however, the “allowed” points for the
placement of the facility could be limited - e.g., a bus stop
needs to be located on the main road. Feldman et al. [2016a]
studied the single-facility location setting in the context of
voting embedded in a metric space, a topic very much re-
lated to that of distortion in metric social choice [Anshelevich
et al., 2018]. Among other results, for the line metric, they
provided a deterministic 3-approximation mechanism, which
places the facility at the candidate location that is closest to
the median agent, as well as a randomized 2-approximation
mechanism for the social cost, together with matching lower
bounds. Tang et al. [2020b] further considered the maximum
cost objective and the case of two-facility location. Walsh
[2020a] considered a related setting in which each facility can
be placed in a finite set of feasible subintervals.
Distance constraints. Zou and Li [2015] initiated the study
of settings with two facilities, in which the placement of one
of them imposes constraints on the placement of the other.
In particular, they considered the maximum distance require-
ment, namely that the distance between the two facilities can-
not exceed a certain threshold, for the two-opposite-facility
problem; in this setting, there is one desired and one unde-
sired facility, and the utility of each agent is the distance to
undesired one minus the distance to the desired one. Later,
Chen et al. [2018] and Chen et al. [2021] relaxed the
maximum distance constraint by instead imposing a penalty,
which is linear in the degree of violation. Xu et al. [2021]
studied the analogous minimum distance requirement for het-
erogeneous two-facility locations, where the cost of an agent
is the sum of her distances to the two facilities and Xu et al.
[2020] studied the case with an exact distance requirement.
Capacitated facilities. The study of capacitated facility lo-
cation games was initiated by Aziz et al. [2020b]. They
studied a single-facility location problem with capacity con-
straints on the real line and provided a complete characteri-
zation of strategyproof mechanisms, quite similar to that of
[Moulin, 1980]. In a follow-up work, Aziz et al. [2020a]
considered a more general setting with k facilities and dif-
ferent capacities for each facility. Among other results, the
authors proposed the Extended Endpoint Mechanism for the
case of two facilities, which achieves a tight approximation
ratio matching the lower bound proven in [Aziz et al., 2020b].
6 Further Variants
In this section, we present some further interesting variants
that do not quite fit any of the categories presented earlier.
Other social objectives. Besides the social cost and the
maximum cost, the literature has also been concerned with
other objectives. Feigenbaum et al. [2017] considered the
minimization of the Lp-norm of costs for the real line met-
ric, whereas Feldman and Wilf [2013] studied the objective
of minimizing the sum of squares of the costs. In a markedly
different direction, Cai et al. [2016] studied the minimax envy
objective for single-facility location, where the envy of an
agent with respect to another agent is simply their difference
in distance from the facility, and the goal is to minimize the
maximum envy over all the agents; we remark that contrary to
most of the present results in this survey, the approximations
of [Cai et al., 2016] are additive. In a similar vain, Ding et
al. [2020] and Liu et al. [2021] studied the envy ratio, which
is defined as the maximum over the ratios between any two
agents’ utilities. Mei et al. [2019] introduced a happiness
factor within [0, 1] to measure the difference between the best
possible facility location for an agent and the one selected
by the mechanism, in both settings of standard and obnox-
ious facility games. In this regime, the goal of the agent is
to maximize her happiness factor, and the mechanism aims to
maximize the sum of those factors.
Double-peaked preferences. Filos-Ratsikas et al. [2015]
studied the single-facility location problem with double-
peaked preferences, where each agent has two peaks on the
real line, and the cost increases as one moves away from ei-
ther peak. The authors provided approximation ratio upper
and lower bounds for deterministic and randomized strate-
gyproof mechanisms, as well as an axiomatic characterization
of group strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy some standard
neutrality properties.
Externalities. Li et al. [2019b] considered settings where
agents mutually influence each other, i.e., when one agent’s
utility positively or negatively affect some other agents’.
Weighted agents. Zhang and Li [2014] introduced weights
to the agents, and showed that when weights are private infor-
mation, the best that a deterministic strategyproof mechanism
can do is to simply ignore them.
Distributed facility location. Recently, Filos-Ratsikas and
Voudouris [2020] introduced a setting in which the facility lo-
cation is selected as part of a distributed process: first, agents
within groups (or districts) decide on a representative location
and then the mechanism, oblivious to the actual locations of
the agents, decides on a location from the set of representa-
tives. The authors proved that the best possible strategyproof
mechanism for this setting has an approximation ratio of 3.
Approximation and variance. Procaccia et al. [2018] con-
sidered the topic of reducing the variance of randomized strat-
egyproof mechanisms while maintaining good approximation
guarantees, by using the single-facility location problem as
the application domain.
Additive approximations. Instead of multiplicative approxi-
mation ration, Golomb and Tzamos [2017] studied the worst-
case additive approximation, and presented tight bounds for
mechanisms locating a single facility in both deterministic
and randomized cases. They also argued that this measure is
better suited for some situations.
Shuttle facility games. Fukui et al. [2020] introduced the
shuttle facility games, where each agent’ location is actu-
ally an interval in the line representing her commuting route.
They designed a corresponding group strategyproof mecha-
nism which also achieves the optimal social welfare.
Mechanisms with payments. Archer and Tardos [2001]
studied a conceptually similar but fundamentally different fa-
cility location problem, a monetary model. Given a set of
facilities holders and a set of customers, the facilities hold-
ers are strategic players and are required to report their pri-
vate cost for them to be built. Once receiving the reports, the
government needs to select a subset of facilities to build, and
monetarily compensate these facilities with payment to guar-
antee truthful reports. They proven that any algorithm that
solves the uncapacitated facility location problem optimally
admits a truthful mechanism. Li et al. [2020] further studied
this monetary model with a sharp budget constraint: the total
payment of a mechanism is below a given budget. Chen et al.
[2019] considered a dual-role setting where every agent plays
both roles of facility holder and customer.
Automated mechanism design. There are also some works
that use machine learning and deep learning approaches to
design automated mechanisms; for example, see [Golowich
et al., 2018; Narasimhan et al., 2016].
7 Future Research Directions
Many open problems related to all the different facility loca-
tion variants were already implicit in our exposition in pre-
vious sections; we conclude this survey by identifying some
settings which we believe deserve some special attention as
part of future work.
Dynamic facility location. Most of the work on the prob-
lem assumes a static model, in which the agents’ locations
are fixed over time. Exceptions to this are two fairly recent
works [De Keijzer and Wojtczak, 2018; Fotakis et al., 2021]
who considered multi-stage facility reallocation problems on
the real line, where the facilities are being moved between
stages based on the locations reported by the agents and the
goal is to minimize the social cost by keeping the reallocation
cost low as well. Another exception is the work of Wada et
al. [2018], who investigated settings with variable and dy-
namic populations, affecting the choices of the designer. We
believe that there is ample space for future work here, with
more dynamic settings potentially amenable to approximate
mechanism design.
Incomplete information. Another interesting avenue is to
explore stochastic settings, where the information about the
agents’ locations and preferences contains uncertainty, or is
based on distributional assumptions. Along those lines, Cara-
giannis et al. [2016], motivated by machine-learning ap-
plications, considered single-facility location when agents’
locations are independently and identically drawn from an
unknown distribution. In a more “possibilistic” approach,
Menon and Larson [2019] considered a setting in which for
each agent there is an interval on the line representing all
her possible locations, and they explore robust mechanisms
that perform well with respect to all the possible unknown
true preferred locations of the agents within those intervals.
These works have only scratched the surface of the effects of
incomplete information on the design of mechanisms for the
problem, and more work in this direction is needed.
Incentives beyond strategyproofness. While strategyproof-
ness is very desirable, it certainly impairs any attempt at good
approximations, especially in settings where there are pro-
hibitive lower bounds (e.g., the n − 2 lower bound on the
social cost for the two-facility location case). It is interesting
to see if relaxing strategyproofness to an ε-approximate ver-
sion, in which agents have very limited incentive to misreport
could “open up” the design space for much improved mech-
anisms. For example, Sui and Boutilier [2015a] provided
several possibility/impossibility results for the ε-approximate
(group) strategy-proofness in both constrained and uncon-
strained problems. Oomine et al. [2017] studied the trade-
off between relaxation on group strategy-proofness and social
benefit gain for obnoxious facilities.
Another option would be to not require any form of strat-
egyproofness and allow the agents to engage in a strategic
game; these games could be then studied using known tech-
niques for analyzing Nash equilibria, and their performance
via the celebrated notion of the Price of Anarchy [Kout-
soupias and Papadimitriou, 1999]. For example, Hotelling
games are proposed by Hotelling [1990] to model the sit-
uations where companies compete for attracting customers
by strategically locating their facilities, and the customers
prefer closer facilities. Recent works have been focus-
ing on characterizing the equilibria and bounding the cor-
responding Price of Anarchy (see [Feldman et al., 2016b;
Ben-Porat and Tennenholtz, 2019]). In another dimension,
Sui and Boutilier [2015b] study the computational problem
of group manipulation: given a mechanism, how can the
agents form collision to manipulate the outcome, in order to
minimize the social cost? When the mechanism is “Quan-
tile”, they solve this problem for single-facility and multi-
dimensional spaces by formulating as cone programs. The
group manipulation for other types of mechanisms is also
worthy being studied.
8 Concluding Remarks
From the abundance of different variants and interesting re-
sults that we have presented in this survey, it is evident that
facility location problems are one of the most fundamental
and most important examples of approximate mechanism de-
sign, and that it is at the very center of a vibrant literature in
the major venues in artificial intelligence. And yet, despite
the marvelous achievements that the literature on the prob-
lem has witnessed during the last decade, the future is noth-
ing short of exciting. We believe that this survey will serve
as a solid point of reference for current and future researchers
in their quest to understand the major challenges, identify the
most intriguing questions, and ultimately advance the state of
the art even further.
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